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Every protocol here carries a dated score and the share of it backed by independently verified evidence. Where that share is still thin the assessment says so, is marked Low-signal rather than given a risk band, and holds every unevidenced category at the neutral midpoint instead of assuming it safe. Every score and its reasoning are free to read; the underlying dependency, incident and audit records are part of a plan. Each reading here is fixed at the date beside it. Re-scoring never stops, but a changed reading reaches plan holders on the day it changes rather than this page, which is what a plan is for. How a score is built, how to read one, and how the rubric was tested against real exploits are all in the methodology.

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Scores run from 0, the safest reading, to 100, the riskiest, where 50 is the neutral midpoint every unverified category is held at. Red marks a protocol scoring 50 or above, the band called Elevated: worse than neutral on the evidence gathered. Amber marks one below it, called Moderate. The boundary is fixed. It does not move as coverage grows, and it is not fitted to any backtest result.

OpenEden TBILL

OpenEden TBILL official site N/A

Unknown

:

  • Evidence: this reading is based on 100% of the scored weight, verified against named sources. Categories without verified data are held at the neutral midpoint at their full weight, never counted as safe.
  • Validation: the rubric is backtested against past exploits of protocols in the same TVL, age and category bucket. None has been evaluated for this one yet, so the reading rests on its evidence alone.

Published 2026-09-06. Up-to-date reading and 2 changes since for subscribers. See plans

Why this rating
Audit profile10.0
3 audits/contests on record, most recent (Hacken, 2024-01-01) has unread findings, scored as unknown, not assumed clean.
Dependency risk9.0
Uses 1 oracle, composable with 5 other protocols. This is a real-world-asset product and the interesting risk is off chain, so it is written out here rather than compressed.
Show the evidenceThe Treasuries are custodied by BNY and managed by BNY Mellon Investment Management Singapore, a fund management company regulated by MAS with a mandate for short-dated US T-bills. The Token Issuer is a British Virgin Islands registered professional fund regulated by the BVI Financial Services Commission under the Securities and Investment Business Act 2010, though OpenEden's own docs never state the fund's legal entity name, referring to it only as the Token Issuer. KYC is a HARD GATE, not advisory: minting and redemption run only through whitelisted, KYC and KYB verified wallets, and TRANSFERS ARE RESTRICTED TO BETWEEN WHITELISTED WALLETS, with a first deposit minimum of 100 000 USDC. Redemption is T+1, typically the next US business day. THERE IS NO PROOF OF RESERVE: no Chainlink PoR and no automated on-chain reserve proof appears anywhere in the TBILL docs; transparency runs on administrator NAV reports plus the annual fund audit, so it is attestation-based rather than cryptographic, and that distinction should be scored. On oracles, the price is OpenEden's own computation pushed on chain with a price-guard circuit breaker whose deviation threshold is not published, and no third-party oracle provider is named. Two things were not established: any bridging model for the multichain deployments, which the docs never describe either way, and the USYC dependency in prose, which is evidenced only by a contract name and two audit filenames.
Code characteristics9.0
Admin key: 4/5 multisig (requires 4 of 5 keys to act), upgradeable without a meaningful timelock, open source.
Governance attack surface7.0
No governance token; control sits with multisig rather than a vote, so decision rights are concentrated rather than capturable. The form of that key is scored separately under code characteristics.
TVL profile3.5
TVL change (-3%) is within a stable range.
Bug bounty3.3
No bug bounty program on record.
Historical incidents2.3
No known own or inherited incidents as of 6 September 2026.
Team factors1.7
Doxxed team, track record: unknown.
Protocol age1.5
1193 days live, past the ~1yr floor; treated the same as any older protocol, not scored progressively safer with more age.
Assets held (0)

No per-symbol breakdown of this protocol's value is published, so there is nothing to read here and nothing has been researched. For an exchange or a bridge this is usually a fact about the protocol rather than a gap: value sits in many user positions rather than in a held set of assets.

Dependencies (2)

Available with a plan. See pricing.

Incident history (0)

Available with a plan. See pricing.

Audit history (3)

Available with a plan. See pricing.

Common questions about OpenEden TBILL

Foreshock's independent reading of OpenEden TBILL is Moderate risk, 47.3 out of 100, as of 6 September 2026. The largest single contributor to that reading is audit profile: 3 audits/contests on record, most recent (Hacken, 2024-01-01) has unread findings, scored as unknown, not assumed clean. All nine scored categories are backed by verified evidence. This published reading is fixed at that date. Re-scoring never stops, and when a reading changes it reaches plan holders on the day it changes rather than this page. Foreshock publishes the reading and the reasoning behind it. It is not a verdict on whether to use this protocol, and it is not investment advice.

Is OpenEden TBILL safe?
Foreshock does not answer that as a yes or a no. Its independent reading of OpenEden TBILL is Moderate risk, 47.3 out of 100, as of 6 September 2026, led by audit profile: 3 audits/contests on record, most recent (Hacken, 2024-01-01) has unread findings, scored as unknown, not assumed clean. The score and the reasoning are published in full so the reading can be checked rather than trusted.
Has OpenEden TBILL been audited?
3 audits/contests on record, most recent (Hacken, 2024-01-01) has unread findings, scored as unknown, not assumed clean. An audit describes the code at the time it was reviewed. It is not a statement that the protocol is safe today.
Who controls OpenEden TBILL?
Admin key: 4/5 multisig (requires 4 of 5 keys to act), upgradeable without a meaningful timelock, open source. No governance token; control sits with multisig rather than a vote, so decision rights are concentrated rather than capturable. The form of that key is scored separately under code characteristics.
Has OpenEden TBILL been exploited before?
No known own or inherited incidents as of 6 September 2026. Foreshock records an incident against a protocol whether it originated there or was inherited from something it depends on.
When was this OpenEden TBILL assessment last updated?
6 September 2026, and that date does not move on its own. A reading published here is fixed when it is published; re-scoring never stops, and a changed reading reaches plan holders on the day it changes rather than this page. Every category carries the date of the evidence behind it.
Also covered on Unknown

This assessment follows Foreshock's published methodology. Exact category weights, scoring rules, thresholds, and aggregation logic are proprietary and not shown here. How to interpret this assessment

This reading will change.

This reading is fixed at the date above it, and it stays there. We keep re-scoring OpenEden TBILL as the evidence moves, a new audit, a changed admin control, an incident, and this page is free to read and always will be. The updated reading is what a plan buys: you are told by email on the day it changes, instead of finding out the next time you happen to look.

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