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Every protocol here carries a dated score and the share of it backed by independently verified evidence. Where that share is still thin the assessment says so, is marked Low-signal rather than given a risk band, and holds every unevidenced category at the neutral midpoint instead of assuming it safe. Every score and its reasoning are free to read; the underlying dependency, incident and audit records are part of a plan. Each reading here is fixed at the date beside it. Re-scoring never stops, but a changed reading reaches plan holders on the day it changes rather than this page, which is what a plan is for. How a score is built, how to read one, and how the rubric was tested against real exploits are all in the methodology.

Coverage grows three ways: protocols Foreshock selects at its own discretion, protocols requested through the Request coverage button, and sponsored assessments delivered on an agreed timeline. No path has a guaranteed date except sponsorship.

Scores run from 0, the safest reading, to 100, the riskiest, where 50 is the neutral midpoint every unverified category is held at. Red marks a protocol scoring 50 or above, the band called Elevated: worse than neutral on the evidence gathered. Amber marks one below it, called Moderate. The boundary is fixed. It does not move as coverage grows, and it is not fitted to any backtest result.

Teller

Teller official site N/A

Multi-Chain

:

  • Evidence: this reading is based on 100% of the scored weight, verified against named sources. Categories without verified data are held at the neutral midpoint at their full weight, never counted as safe.
  • Validation: the rubric is backtested against past exploits of protocols in the same TVL, age and category bucket. Protocols of this scale and kind have no such history - a limit of the record itself, not unfinished work.

Published 2026-09-23, unchanged since. Subscribers are told the day it changes.

Why this rating
Audit profile10.0
3 audits on record, most recent audit is 1-2 years old; the most recent audit found 3 High and 8 Medium severity issues. This reflects code quality at the time of that audit only, not a claim that these specific issues are still unresolved today.
Governance attack surface7.0
No governance token; control sits with timelock rather than a vote, so decision rights are concentrated rather than capturable. The form of that key is scored separately under code characteristics.
Dependency risk6.8
Uses 1 oracle, composable with 1 other protocol. TellerV2's own core lending path (TellerV2.sol: submitBid/lenderAcceptBid) is a bilaterally-negotiated order-book loan with no on-chain margin liquidation and so no price-oracle dependency at all - Sherlock's own 2024-04-29 audit report describes Teller as offering loans 'with no margin liquidations for the duration of a loan'.
Show the evidenceThe permissionless pooled-lending extension added since (LenderCommitmentForwarder/extensions/LenderCommitmentGroup, in scope for the 2024-04-29 and 2024-12-10 Sherlock audits) values collateral against the loan token using per-market PriceAdapter contracts read directly from teller-protocol/teller-protocol-v2's own GitHub repository (contracts/price_adapters/: PriceAdapterUniswapV2.sol, PriceAdapterUniswapV3.sol, PriceAdapterUniswapV4.sol, PriceAdapterAlgebra.sol, PriceAdapterAerodrome.sol) - on-chain DEX pool TWAPs, not a third-party price-feed network like Chainlink. A separate contracts/oracleprotection/HypernativeOracle.sol exists but is an access-control/risk-flagging registry (AccessControl-gated register/blacklist of accounts, read directly), not a price oracle, so it is not recorded here. No bridge dependency: the protocol's own answer in the 2024-04-29 Sherlock contest's public Q&A (github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-04-teller-finance) states plainly, 'Our protocol does not directly deal with bridging,' and each chain deployment (Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, Polygon, and others added since per teller-protocol-v2's deployments/ directory) runs its own independent TellerV2 instance rather than moving assets or messages between chains.
Code characteristics6.8
Admin key: timelock, upgradeable without a meaningful timelock, open source.
TVL profile6.5
TVL is 93% below this protocol's own peak and has not recovered, so the revenue that funds audits, bounties and maintenance is largely gone while the contracts still hold value; TVL change (0%) is within a stable range.
Historical incidents2.2
No known own or inherited incidents as of 23 September 2026.
Team factors1.7
Doxxed team, track record: unknown.
Bug bounty1.5
Has a bug bounty program, hosted on Immunefi.
Protocol age1.5
1275 days live, past the ~1yr floor; treated the same as any older protocol, not scored progressively safer with more age.
Assets held (5)

Available with a plan. See pricing.

Dependencies (2)

Available with a plan. See pricing.

Incident history (0)

Available with a plan. See pricing.

Audit history (3)

Available with a plan. See pricing.

Common questions about Teller

Foreshock's independent reading of Teller is Moderate risk, 44.0 out of 100, as of 23 September 2026. The largest single contributor to that reading is audit profile: 3 audits on record, most recent audit is 1-2 years old; the most recent audit found 3 High and 8 Medium severity issues. This reflects code quality at the time of that audit only, not a claim that these specific issues are still unresolved today. All nine scored categories are backed by verified evidence. This published reading is fixed at that date. Re-scoring never stops, and when a reading changes it reaches plan holders on the day it changes rather than this page. Foreshock publishes the reading and the reasoning behind it. It is not a verdict on whether to use this protocol, and it is not investment advice.

Is Teller safe?
Foreshock does not answer that as a yes or a no. Its independent reading of Teller is Moderate risk, 44.0 out of 100, as of 23 September 2026, led by audit profile: 3 audits on record, most recent audit is 1-2 years old; the most recent audit found 3 High and 8 Medium severity issues. This reflects code quality at the time of that audit only, not a claim that these specific issues are still unresolved today. The score and the reasoning are published in full so the reading can be checked rather than trusted.
Has Teller been audited?
3 audits on record, most recent audit is 1-2 years old; the most recent audit found 3 High and 8 Medium severity issues. This reflects code quality at the time of that audit only, not a claim that these specific issues are still unresolved today. An audit describes the code at the time it was reviewed. It is not a statement that the protocol is safe today.
Who controls Teller?
Admin key: timelock, upgradeable without a meaningful timelock, open source. No governance token; control sits with timelock rather than a vote, so decision rights are concentrated rather than capturable. The form of that key is scored separately under code characteristics.
Has Teller been exploited before?
No known own or inherited incidents as of 23 September 2026. Foreshock records an incident against a protocol whether it originated there or was inherited from something it depends on.
When was this Teller assessment last updated?
23 September 2026, and that date does not move on its own. A reading published here is fixed when it is published; re-scoring never stops, and a changed reading reaches plan holders on the day it changes rather than this page. Every category carries the date of the evidence behind it.
Also covered on Multi-Chain

This assessment follows Foreshock's published methodology. Exact category weights, scoring rules, thresholds, and aggregation logic are proprietary and not shown here. How to interpret this assessment

This reading will change.

This reading is fixed at the date above it, and it stays there. We keep re-scoring Teller as the evidence moves, a new audit, a changed admin control, an incident, and this page is free to read and always will be. The updated reading is what a plan buys: you are told by email on the day it changes, instead of finding out the next time you happen to look.

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